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## SOVIET UNION

### 1. USSR may participate in Geneva air show:

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[REDACTED] The secretary of the Soviet legation in Bern on 1 June told Swiss sponsors of the air show scheduled for 24 June - 17 July in Geneva that the USSR was seriously considering participation. The Soviet embassy earlier indicated that the USSR wished to participate on the same scale as the United States.

Soviet officials in Bern had informally indicated that the USSR was considering sending three MIG jet fighters and other types. The secretary of the Soviet legation asked for detailed information on the Geneva airport for the possible accommodation of Soviet jet bombers and stated that if the bombers could not land they might overfly the field.

Comment: Soviet participation in the Geneva air show might be designed to raise questions in Western Europe as to American air supremacy.

Since the runway at Geneva could handle Soviet jet light, medium, and probably heavy bombers, a Soviet decision not to land there would probably stem from a reluctance to make these types available for close inspection.

## FAR EAST

### 2. South Korean official denies Seoul intends to withdraw mission from Japan:

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[REDACTED] Counselor Yu of the South Korean diplomatic mission in Japan told American officials in Tokyo on 1 June that, contrary to rumors, his government was not contemplating withdrawing its diplomatic mission from Tokyo in the near future.

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He said the United States would be consulted in advance if such a move were seriously considered.

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Yu, who has been co-operative with American officials in Japan, is close to Rhee and probably would be aware of any plans for closing the mission in Tokyo.

#### SOUTHEAST ASIA

#### 3. French fear Indian initiative in arranging all-Vietnam election:

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The French Foreign Ministry believes that India is preparing a plan under which the International Control Commission would act as intermediary between the Vietnamese government and the Viet Minh in connection with arrangements for the elections specified by the Geneva agreement.

The French think that any unilateral action of this nature by the Indians, or by the ICC as a whole, would be strongly opposed by the Vietnamese government. They fear that if the Ho and Diem regimes are not brought together on 20 July on Western initiative, the Viet Minh will take the initiative and claim that a violation of the Geneva agreement has occurred.


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The Vietnamese government has not yet formulated its position, but the foreign minister believes that support for the principle of completely free elections should be declared promptly. He has said the Vietnamese could not enter direct discussions with the Viet Minh and suggested that some body such as the UN act as a go-between. Another Vietnamese official has stated the government could not engage in talks with the Viet Minh until a national assembly had been elected.


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#### SOUTH ASIA

##### 5. Comment on Afghan economic mission to Moscow:

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An Afghan delegation arrived in Moscow on 28 May to discuss a freight transit agreement with the USSR to offset Pakistani economic pressure.

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The Afghan approach to the USSR apparently represents a vigorous reaction on the part of Prime Minister Daud to a threatened blockade of Afghanistan's regular trade routes through Pakistan. It is probably designed primarily to induce Pakistan to modify its position in the dispute between the two countries and to put pressure on the West to withhold support from Pakistan.

The switching of Afghanistan's normal export-import traffic from the established transportation pattern through Pakistan to one through the Soviet Union would be uneconomic. If the Soviet Union deemed it sufficiently advantageous politically, however, it could devise a channel of trade. Completion of a favorable agreement would give the Afghans a better bargaining position in negotiations with Pakistan.

#### NEAR EAST - AFRICA

##### 6. UN observers expect Israeli attempts to seize Gaza strip:



United Nations military observers in Israel are convinced that Israeli forces will in the immediate future attempt to drive Egyptian troops and Arab refugees out of the Gaza strip, according to Colonel Ely, a deputy to UN truce supervisor Burns. These observers believe the Israeli army could take the Gaza strip in a matter of hours.


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Comment: Israeli seizure of the Gaza strip would likely lead to full-scale hostilities with the Arab states. Tel Aviv appears to be at the point of decision on its future policy toward Arab border infiltrations. Faced with national elections in late July, the governing Mapai party may decide on a tougher policy in order not to lose votes to "activists" of other parties. It is not yet clear, however, whether the Israeli leaders are ready for war.


Egyptian prime minister Nasr told General Burns on 1 June that he could not keep Egyptian troops from firing first on Israeli patrols approaching their positions, and added that "If the Israelis want war, I suppose it will have to come."

7. Mass violence in Casablanca feared:

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 European residents of Casablanca are in danger of massacre, in the opinion of Philippe Boniface, a retired French official residing there. A former French director of security in Morocco confirmed to the American consul general in Rabat that there is danger of an outbreak of mass violence even though there are heavy concentrations of French troops and police in the city.


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EASTERN EUROPE

8. Soviet ground forces in Germany receiving large number of new medium tanks:

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 It is estimated that nearly 1,000 new-model medium tanks (T-54's) have been shipped to East Germany from the USSR during the past five months. This represents about one fourth of the present authorized medium tank strength of Soviet ground forces in Germany. At the current rate of delivery, Soviet forces in East Germany would be completely re-equipped with the new tanks by mid-1956.

When delivery of new tanks to East Germany began in significant quantities early in 1955, priority was apparently given to Soviet tank divisions. There are indications that some of the mechanized divisions may now also be receiving these tanks.

The older T-34 medium tanks are apparently not yet being withdrawn from Germany, and some may have been transferred to Soviet rifle divisions. Retention of the T-34's in service in Germany would increase the total authorized tank strength of Soviet units there.

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
10. Comment on Soviet-Yugoslav communiqué

The Soviet-Yugoslav communiqué of 2 June stresses for the most part issues on which Moscow and Belgrade were already in general agreement, glossing over such questions as the re-establishment of closer party ties, on which the USSR presumably hoped to gain concessions from Tito.

The most noteworthy aspect of the part of the declaration referring directly to relations between the two countries appears to be its vagueness. Such statements as those referring to an "exchange of socialist experience" and "mutual cooperation" in the peaceful uses of atomic energy could conceivably be a cover for far more significant agreements, the details of which remain to be worked out. It is far more likely, however, that any noteworthy meeting of the minds on specific issues, such as settlement of Yugoslavia's economic claims, would have been publicized in detail as signs of visible success of the negotiations in Belgrade.

Soviet agreement to include a statement that "questions of different forms of socialist development are solely the concern of individual countries" is an important concession to Yugoslavia.

The communiqué fails to show Yugoslav support for the Soviet position on controversial international issues, except that it endorses Communist China's right to membership in the United Nations and the satisfaction by peaceful means of its "legitimate rights" to Formosa. Both of these Belgrade has supported in the past. On other international issues, such as disarmament, German unification, and European security, the declaration is so vague as to be almost meaningless. It can, nevertheless, be exploited to enhance Moscow's efforts to present the USSR as a champion of peace and relaxation of international tensions.



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